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  and Apoorva Tapas** 
The deliberation on the lack of transparency and the 
vociferous demand for a mechanism to ensure 
accountability in public life has gathered momentum in 
the recent past. Judicial independence and accountability 
are the prerequisites for a transparent judiciary enjoying 
public confidence, which is the hallmark of a healthy 
democracy. This article seeks to examine the relationship 
between accountability and independence of the judiciary 
in view of the need and urgency of transparency, due to 
various controversies surrounding the Judiciary. The 
apparent dichotomy between the two is also elaborated. It 
is premised that judicial independence has an inextricable 
relationship with judicial accountability. The dichotomy 
between the two is rather superimposed and the need of 
the hour is to dispel this very myth.  
Viewing accountability to be at loggerheads with 
independence overlooks their subtle relationship. The 
former, if unbridled, leads to a crisis of legitimation of the 
law, posing a challenge for the judiciary to establish its 
independence. The element of accountability, thus, needs 
to be secured steadfastly and must be seen as a 
supplement of independence, and not a hindrance 
thereto. 
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Introduction 
“In a pluralist society judges are the essential equalisers. They serve 
no majority or any minority either. Their duty is to the law and to 
justice. They do not bend the knee to the governments, to particular 
religions, to the military, to money, to tabloid media or the 
screaming mob. In upholding law and justice, judges have a vital 
function in a pluralist society to make sure that diversity is 
respected and the rights of all protected.”  
-Justice Michael Kirby1
On numerous occasions, the activist stance and creative 
interpretation of the judiciary has proved that it plays a vital role in 
protecting individuals against the misuse of state power while 
functioning as the custodian of their rights. As the final arbiter and 
enforcer of the constitutional limitations on government, it has the 
power to prevent the powerful engines of executive authority from 
running amok and must therefore be above board in its moral 
standards in dispensation of justice. Being a cornerstone of 
democracy,
 
2
While many judicial decisions have shaped the Indian polity to a 
great extent, ensuring fairness in the process of governance, 
nonetheless, allegations questioning the integrity of this great 
institution have increased manifold, ascribable to the lack of 
transparency. Rampant corruption and lack of accountability have 
 the presence of a strong, independent and efficient 
judiciary, both in letter and spirit, is indispensable for guaranteeing 
constitutional rights. 
                                                          
1 Poornima Advani, All India Meeting of Chief Justices of High Courts on 
Women Empowerment vis-a-vis Legislation and Judicial Decision (Jan. 
2005), 
http://ncw.nic.in/pdfreports/All%20India%20Meeting%20of%20chief%2
0Justice.pdf. 
2 All India Judge’s Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 S.C.C. 247 ¶24 
(establishing that is part of the basic structure doctrine); see also S.C. Advocates 
on Record v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 268 ¶421. 
Judicial Accountability                   Christ University Law Journal, 1, 1(2012) 
71 
 
diluted the trust reposed in the conscience keepers of the law. 
Legality is not legitimacy anymore for the Indian people. The 
‘consensual foundations’ of the law are under a great stress. Our 
legal system suffers from endemic delays and is widely perceived 
to be an expensive affair. There is a dire need for judicial 
accountability to arise from within, to ensure a system of operative 
checks and balances to prevent any unwarranted usurping of 
power. Unfortunately, this has been met with resistance from 
within the judiciary, afraid of encroachment into the realm of its 
independence. This paper debates the ills which are affecting the 
Indian judiciary. It makes certain recommendations which can be 
adopted to ensure greater judicial accountability. 
Corruption in Judiciary 
In the last few decades, corruption has steadily spread its tentacles 
in the Indian judiciary. Corruption is encountered in the guise of 
bribery, influence peddling, intimidation and coercion.3
Though the issue of accountability has plagued the judiciary for 
long, the recent spate of scandals have precipitated a crisis. Never 
before have such grave charges been levied against the judiciary.
 It is driven 
by many factors including executive interference, lack of citizen 
voice, social pressure and low salaries. Judicial corruption in 
addition to corroding the rule of law also undermines the 
effectiveness of other institutions. 
4
                                                          
3 UPENDRA BAXI, THE CRISIS OF INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1st ed. 1982).  
4 Shoma Chaudhury, Half of the Last 16 Chief Justices were Corrupt, TEHELKA, 
Sept.5, 2009,  
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main42.asp?filename=Ne050909half_of.a
sp (“Prashant Bhushan stated that out of the last 16 Chief Justices of India, eight 
were definitely corrupt”); see also Eight of 16 CJIs were corrupt: Ex-law minister, 
FRONTLINE, Sept. 16, 2010, 
http://www.thestatesman.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=ar
ticle&id=341694&catid=36 (“Shanti Bhushan while impleading himself in the 
Contempt case pending against his son put forth the case affected the judiciary as 
a whole and needs to be decided by the entire court”).  
 
Even judges of the High Court and Supreme Court are suspected of 
bribery and delinquency. Today, the decrepit judiciary suffers from 
Udai Singh  and Apoorva Tapas                                               ISSN 2278-4322 
72 
 
a syndrome of unbecoming behaviour.5 The lack of judicial 
accountability is visibly acute in the higher judiciary, since the 
lower judiciary is accountable to the High Courts.6
‘Absolute Power Corrupts’: Impeachment a Farce 
 Thus, 
corruption in the higher judiciary is presumably more than that in 
the lower judiciary, considering the fact High Courts being vested 
with the power would take serious steps to curb corruption in the 
lower judiciary.  
From a bird’s eye-view, it is apparent that two paralegal systems 
are functioning: one for the rich and resourceful wielding power 
and influence, another for those who do not to have the capability 
to fight injustice. The enforcement of rights and liabilities varies 
with the positioning in the socio-economic structure. 
“Men who make their way to the Bench sometimes exhibit vanity, 
irascibility, narrowness, arrogance and other weaknesses to which 
human flesh is heir.”7
At the time of framing the Constitution, it was believed that 
misconduct by judges of the higher judiciary would be very rare. 
The Constitution prescribed impeachment as the only way of 
 
Corruption is a malaise that is quick to permeate through all strata 
of society, if unchecked by appropriate regulatory mechanisms. 
While corruption is reprehensible in any form, judicial corruption 
is by far the worst form due to the sublime position of the judiciary. 
Can we yield to it and be indifferent? Can petty corruption of the 
kind practiced by clerks be equated with corruption in the 
judiciary? The underlying philosophy of accountability operates in 
an attempt to bypass this very perverse manifestation of 
widespread arbitrariness and corruption. The need for 
accountability, desirable for the efficient functioning of any 
institution, assumes a greater significance in this context. 
                                                          
5 V.R. Krishna Iyer, Time for change, FRONTLINE, Feb. 26 to Mar. 11, 2011, 
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2805/stories/20110311280510600.htm.  
6 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art.227(1). 
7 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952). 
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removing the judges, that too on the basis of proven misbehaviour 
or incapacity.8 These expectations have long been belied by the 
infamous impeachment of Justice V. Ramaswami.9 The realisation 
of impeachment being virtually impossible due to the long drawn 
out and impractical process10
The Supreme Court (hereinafter referred to as ‘SC’) is powerless to 
take any action against an errant judge and at best can disallow 
him from hearing cases. The government too, lacks constitutional 
competence to investigate allegations against the higher judiciary. 
Till now, there have been only three instances of investigation 
against the judges of the higher judiciary under the Judges 
(Inquiry) Act, 1968.
 has instilled a feeling of impunity 
amongst judges. 
11
                                                          
8 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art.124(4) read with art. 124(2)(b)  and art. 
217(1)(b). 
9 Dubious First, TEHELKA, Dec. 30, 2006,  
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main24.asp?filename=Ne123006Dubious_first.asp 
(Justice Ramaswami of the Supreme Court was sought to be impeached on 
grounds of brazen financial irregularities committed by him. Despite the Inquiry 
Committee holding him “guilty of willful and gross misuses of office”, the motion 
was defeated in Parliament. This was done by unscrupulous politicians involved 
in the false rivalry between North and South). 
10 K. Veeraswami v. Union of India and Ors., 1991 S.C.C. (3) 655 (the Supreme 
Court violated the statutory provision of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in 
its judgment by stating that no First Information Report(FIR) can be registered 
against any judge without the permission of the Chief Justice of India. This is a 
classic Catch-22 situation, wherein the police cannot dare to approach the CJI 
without foolproof evidence, which cannot be obtained without investigation). 
11 Justice Soumitra Sen, Justice Dinakaran and Justice Nirmal Yadav. See 
Chaudhury, supra, note 4. 
  
Witness the farce over Justice Dinakaran, former Chief Justice of 
High Court of Karanataka, who even while facing impeachment 
proceedings in the Rajya Sabha over grave charges of corruption, 
was allowed to take over as Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court. 
Is it sadly implicit that the people of north-east region merit lower 
standards of justice? 
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It is prima facie evident that there is lack of credible mechanisms 
for securing accountability of the higher judiciary. It thus becomes 
imperative that the judges are appointed after investigation into 
their antecedents and class bias. The need of the hour is to curb 
delinquency in the judiciary to salvage its grace through the 
enactment of a legislation. There should be zero tolerance towards 
tainted judges, exemplary punishment being dispensed as a 
deterrent. 
The Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2006 was introduced in the Lok Sabha 
after incorporating almost all of the Law Commission of India’s 
recommendations. It sought to establish a National Judicial 
Commission12 to investigate individual complaints and motions for 
removal of a judge moved in Parliament. Amongst the many 
glaring flaws in this Bill was the constitution of the Council 
consisting of members of the judiciary to investigate and inquire 
into allegations arising out of complaint or reference.  Judicial 
accountability is generally sought effectively through an external 
regulatory authority. Ironically, the in-house procedure comprises 
of sitting judges to investigate into the alleged charges of 
misconduct, posturing themselves in the garb of an external 
authority. This negates the very purpose of seeking accountability 
as it violates the principle of natural justice, that no man shall be 
the judge in his own cause.13
The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010
 
14 seems to be 
the only hope in the right direction. Optimistically, it will not meet 
the same fate as its predecessor.15
                                                          
12 Comprising of the Chief Justice of India, two Supreme Court judges and 
two High Court Chief Justices for investigating High Court judges; or the 
Chief Justice of India and four Supreme Court judges for investigating 
Supreme Court judges.  
13 Nemo judex in causa sua. 
 
14 Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee On Personnel, 
Public Grievances, Law And Justice Invites Suggestions On The Judicial 
Standards And Accountability Bill, 2010, http:// 164.100.24.167/ 
newcommittee/press_release/press/Committee%20on%20Personnel,%20
PublicGrievances,%20Law%20and%20Justice/JSA%20Bill.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2012) (introduced in Lok Sabha on 1st December, 2010 and seeks to 
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Judicial Independence 
“The principle of the complete independence of the judiciary from 
the executive is the foundation of many things in our island life. It 
is perhaps one of the deepest gulfs between us and all forms of 
totalitarian rule.” -Sir Winston Churchill16
An independent judiciary is the bulwark of governance. The 
provisions of appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary
 
17 and 
the conduct of the Judges,18
While there has always subsisted a tussle between the legislature 
and the executive to assume control over the judiciary, 
 whereby duties discharged by judges 
cannot be discussed in the Parliament or State Legislature insulate 
the judiciary from political processes. 
19 an 
independent judiciary free from unwarranted political interference 
has been held to be a sine qua non for a democratic society.20 ‘The 
Basic Principles on Independence of the Judiciary’21
                                                                                                                                    
repeal The Judicial (Inquiry) Act, 1968. Department Related Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice press 
release). 
15 The Constitution (Ninety-Eighth Amendment) Bill, 2003; see also The 
Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2006 and The Judges (Declaration of Assets and 
Liabilities) Bill, 2009 (which lapsed due to dissolution of the Lok Sabha). 
16 PARL. DEB., H.C.  (4th ser.) (1954) 1061 (U.K.). 
17 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art.124(2), art.217(1). 
18 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art. 121, art. 211. 
19 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, 258 (deciding on the independence of 
the judiciary was a key concern of the Constituent Assembly). 
20 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (independence of 
judiciary is the foundation of the Indian democratic polity rests. It also gave the 
executive the veto power over the collegium’s choice). 
21 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, http:// 
www2.ohchr.org/english/law/indjudiciary.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 
2012). 
 adopted by the 
United Nations in 1985 and ‘The Beijing Principles on the 
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Independence of the Judiciary, 1997’22 emphasized the need for 
judicial independence. Also, a plethora of rulings pronounced by 
the Supreme Court have stressed the need for an independent 
judiciary. In State of Bihar v. Balmukund Shah,23 judicial 
independence was said to be a constituent element of the basic 
structure of the Constitution, the seeds of which were born in 
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.24
Indian administrative law mandates that the possibility of misuse 
of discretionary power is no excuse for not granting it. But one 
wonders at the mechanism available to the victims of misuse of 
such power and its accessibility to the victims. It is well known that 
the poor don’t ‘access’ the legal system and are drawn into it 
unwittingly in situations of conﬂict with the law.  
  
25
The cruel hollowness of law is gradually revealed to the victims 
who undergo an endless process of re-victimisation.
 The inability of 
the poor to access the justice system can be attributed to illiteracy, 
cultural inhibitions, bureaucratic and political corruption.  
26
The perturbing trend of hand-picking judges on the basis of 
undisclosed criteria reflects an increasing democratic deficit. 
Judicial independence is compromised when the executive has the 
 Therefore, it 
is crucial that judges are unusually insensitive to injustice. While 
placing a premium on judicial independence, the judiciary must 
capture and maintain the public confidence it seeks to protect.  
                                                          
22 Lawasia & the Asia Foundation, The Beijing Statement of Principles of 
the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA region, 1997, 
http://lawasia.asn.au/objectlibrary/147?filename=Beijing%20Statement.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
23 A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1296 at 294. 
24 A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
25 N.R. Madhava Menon, Legal Aid and Justice for the Poor, in LAW AND 
POVERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS, 345 (Upendra Baxi ed., 1989) (“the poor come to 
use the legal system only when so compelled by being drawn into it as accused 
and defendants”). 
26 Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, 1989 S.C.C. (2) 540 (Bhopal Gas 
Tragedy case); see also Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India & Ors., 
A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3751.  
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power to appoint or transfer judges, which is used to promote 
those who make ‘correct’ decisions. In the pre-1993 scenario, 
appointments were arbitrary and supersession was not uncommon. 
It is unfortunate that underlying the written constitution exists an 
unwritten constitution which embodies protocols of collaboration 
between the executive and the judiciary. The notion of the senior-
most judge of the Supreme Court being elevated as Chief Justice is 
an aspect of this unwritten constitution.27
Judicial Accountability 
 Though increasing 
transparency is strongly recommended there still subsists a valid 
fear that this could give room to the executive to step in. 
“Only virtuous people are capable of freedom” 
Benjamin Franklin28
It is crucial to understand the relevance of judicial accountability. 
Judicial independence cannot have an isolated existence because 
the faith of the citizenry can be reposed only in an accountable 
judiciary. Only an increased public perception of judicial 
accountability which is directly dependent on personal 
accountability can determine the degree of acceptable judicial 
independence. Thus, judicial accountability is a necessary means to 
reinforce independence and to ensure an effective judiciary. It is 
 
Accountability functions on the framework of seeking integrity 
which is essential for the efficient functioning of any authority 
entrusted with responsibility. It primarily entails instilling a sense 
of transparency and subjecting the judicial regime to a strict public 
scrutiny so as to prevent any judicial delinquency.  
                                                          
27 His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors. v. State of 
Kerala and Anr., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (three senior-most judges in the 
majority formation were superseded by Justice A.N. Ray in appointment as Chief 
Justice of India); see also Additional District Magistrate of Jabalpur v. Shiv 
Kant Shukla, 1976 S.C.C. (2) 521 (Justice H.R. Khanna was superseded by 
Justice M.H. Beg due to the infamous Habeas Corpus case). 
28 Benjamin Franklin, To the Abbes Chalut and Arnoux, in THE WRITINGS OF 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Vol. X, 297 (Jared Sparks ed., 1840). 
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therefore submitted that independence and accountability are two 
sides of the same coin and complement each other. 
The need of an accountability mechanism also stems from the over-
assertiveness of the judiciary to the extent of declaring themselves 
immune from any form of enquiry into their actions. Such a 
reprehensible and autocratic practice makes it all the more onerous 
to ensure that an accountability mechanism to be operative, must 
establish that Judiciary is about the law and not above the law. 
Judicial Accountability v. Judicial Independence 
“The greatest strength of the judiciary is the faith people repose in 
it.”29
It is at this juncture that the long-standing debate between 
accountability impinging upon the independence of judiciary 
becomes significant. The propounding fore-fathers of the 
Constitution did not expressly provide for any mechanism to make 
the judiciary accountable.
 
30 This was to prevent the violation of the 
fundamental edifice of judicial independence, a prerequisite for 
existence of a free and fair judiciary.31 The objective was to promote 
accountability through a mechanism of self-regulation without 
compromising the facet of independence. Greater accountability 
eradicates disastrous consequences of letting a dishonest 
adjudicator decide on the fate of the people who are the real 
stakeholders in the system of justice.32
                                                          
29 Secretary General, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, A.I.R. 
2010 Delhi 159 ¶ 73. 
30 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, 218. 
31 While Article 235 was included to make the subordinate judiciary 
accountable to the higher judiciary, no similar provisions were enacted for 
the higher judiciary.  
32 V. Venkatesan, Of Accountability to the People, FRONTLINE, Sept., 2009 at 
33. 
 Only in recent times have 
there been public outcries and debates for holding the judiciary 
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accountable, with the civil society and the media assuming the role 
of alert watchdogs.33
The Supreme Court on May 7, 1997 adopted a self-regulating 
mechanism in the form of a resolution.
 
34 Later, the Chief Justice’s 
Conference, 1999 endorsed the same, followed by the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002.35 Unfortunately, due to the 
absence of any mechanism to verify the compliance of what was 
declared, there has never been any verification. India has also 
recently ratified36 the UN Convention against Corruption37, which 
provides for parties to ‘take measure to strengthen integrity and 
prevent corruption in the judiciary’.38
It is rather ironical that despite being one of the few nations in the 
world where a Right to Information  Act, 2005 (hereinafter ‘RTI’) 
legislation functions effectively, the judiciary seeks insulation from 
public view defending its independence and still refuses to make 
public information about the manner in which judges are 
appointed or transferred. It has gone to the extent of filing a Special 
Leave Petition directly in the SC against orders of the Chief 
Information Commissioner (hereinafter ‘CIC’) asking the court to 
disclose information about the same.
 
39
                                                          
33 See Chaudhury, supra note 4. 
 Further, contempt powers 
have also been used to ruthlessly silence outspoken criticism and 
34 Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, http:// www.judicialreforms.org/ 
files/restatement_of_values _jud_life.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
35 Judicial Group on strengthening Judicial Integrity, The Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002, http:// www.ajs.org/ ethics/pdfs/ 
Bangalore_principles.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
36 India ratifies UN Convention against Corruption, THE HINDU, May 12, 2011,  
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2012804.ece. 
37 United Nations Convention against Corruption, http:// www.unodc.org 
/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
38 UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 31 
October 2003, A/58/422, art. 11.  
39 CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, 162 (2009) 
D.L.T. 135. 
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public exposure of corruption in the judiciary. The shying away 
from making oneself accountable is sheer naivety as integrity is a 
means of achieving judicial independence. 
Muzzling the Solution? 
Unless the level of corruption in the judiciary is exposed and 
brought out in the public domain, the institutions of governance 
cannot be activated to take effective measures to eliminate this evil. 
However, the draconian power of contempt is often used by the 
judiciary to target public or media scrutiny of judicial misconduct.40
Confidence in judiciary is maintained by the public perception of 
the actions of the judiciary and the conduct of its judges over a long 
period of time. People should be allowed to make an honest fair 
criticism about the working of the judiciary. To punish and stifle 
public criticism in an attempt to muzzle dissent seems futile and 
any such measure would cause far greater damage and lead to a 
backlash, tarnishing the image of the judiciary. It would make 
people suspicious that things are more seriously amiss than they 
had suspected, engendering greater resentment, negating the 
objective of the Law of Contempt.
 
There seems to be an irony in the fact that the judges seek to shield 
themselves through such coercive measures.  
41
Shanti Bhushan, Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court has raised 
a historic challenge by questioning the integrity of the highest 
 Thus, the power vested 
through the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which imposes a fetter 
on the freedom of speech, should be invoked only as a regulatory 
measure with utmost caution. 
                                                          
40 Prashant Bhushan, Judicial Accountability or Illusion: The National Judicial 
Council Bill, ECONOMIC & POLITICAL WEEKLY, Nov. 25, 2006, 
http://www.judicialreforms.org/files/judicial_acc_or_illusion_pb.pdf 
(the “sword of contempt” has removed any form of public criticism). 
41 Journalists Sentenced for Uncovering Corruption, WORLD PRESS, Sept. 25, 
2007, http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/2941.cfm; see We have taken truth 
to be our defence: Vitusha Oberoi, THE HINDU, Sept. 21, 2007, 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200709211658.htm; see also 
Re Arundhati Roy (2002) 3 S.C.C. 343. 
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judiciary and making charges of corruption against eight of 16 past 
Chief Justices of India, thereby posing a serious peril before this 
Republic's crimson future. In an astonishing event, the rarest of the 
rare kind, he has also defiantly challenged the judiciary to take 
action against him for contempt. 
Parliament must act on this matter of paramount importance and 
move a motion appointing the highest quasi-judicial body to 
inquire into the matter. It should be a historic, epic tribunal to try 
its own judges and it requires an appropriate high-level 
investigation, with consequential follow-up action that is punitive 
and reformatory. This is no time to hesitate or involve in an 
exchange of rhetoric, since remaining deaf or dumb in this situation 
will be a matter of shock and shame. 
If Mr. Bhushan fails in his bid, let him face the consequences of his 
phenomenal folly. There should be no contempt proceedings to 
hide delinquent conduct, no secrecy but only transparency, in an 
epic battle more important than the making of the Constitution. It 
should be a national hearing by a superlative tribunal which would 
be a unique, brave judicial odyssey. For, never has such a challenge 
been raised to a nation's supreme body. 
People’s Right to Know and the Need for Maintenance of 
Secrecy in Public Interest 
It is significant to note the importance accorded to ‘right to know’ 
by the apex court as the irony of the situation hinges upon the same 
with the impervious judiciary seeking an immunity from the 
dissemination of information of its own players.  
“In a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of 
the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can but few 
secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every 
public act, everything, that is done in a public way, by their public 
functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every 
public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is 
derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not 
absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is 
claimed for transactions which can, at any rate, have no 
repercussion on public security. To cover with veil secrecy the 
Udai Singh  and Apoorva Tapas                                               ISSN 2278-4322 
82 
 
common routine business, is not in the interest of the public. Such 
secrecy can seldom be legitimately desired. It is generally desired 
for the purpose of parties and politics or personal self-interest or 
bureaucratic routine. The responsibility of officials to explain and 
to justify their acts is the chief safeguard against oppression and 
corruption.”42
The Supreme Court has also declared it mandatory for all electoral 
candidates to make public the details of assets owned by them, 
their spouses and dependants.
  
43
Judicial Privacy v. Judicial Accountability 
 Judges are ‘public servants’ under 
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 
1985 and must stand on the same footing as other public servants.  
Amidst the controversies surrounding the issue of disclosure of 
assets, a bold judgment was delivered by the Delhi High Court in 
the CPIO, SC of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal44
                                                          
42 State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 865 ¶ 74. 
43 Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 
2112. 
44 162 (2009) D.L.T. 135. 
 (hereinafter ‘SC 
Judges Assets case’), on September 2, 2009, ruling that the Chief 
Justice of India could not claim immunity from applicability of the 
RTI Act, 2005. 
This decision calls for transparency measure in governance, 
endorsing the right of the citizens to know the acts of public 
authorities. Scathed with criticisms and a fair share of accolades, 
the ruling is surely a benchmark in the Indian jurisprudence. 
The Appellant had sought to know whether the judges were 
complying with the Code of Conduct adopted at the full meeting of 
the Supreme Court in May, 1997. The Supreme Court had been 
making a distinction between the information held by the Chief 
Justice’s office and by the Supreme Court which was outrightly 
rejected by the CIC. The CIC ruled that Supreme Court is an 
institution created by the Constitution and is thus a ‘Public 
Authority’.  
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The Supreme Court petitioned the Delhi High Court against this 
order of the CIC, claiming exemption from disclosure of assets 
under the RTI Act, 2005 as the judges disclosed this information to 
the CJI under a “fiduciary relationship” and that it was “personal 
information having no relationship to public interest and would 
cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy” of judges. It further 
claimed that the CJI was not a ‘public authority’ under the RTI Act, 
2005. The Supreme Court still maintains this stance despite the 
declaration of assets on the court’s website. His Lordship, Justice 
Ravindra Bhat rejected these claims and held that the CJI had to 
disclose the information about assets. Since the code of conduct 
was adopted by the judges themselves, there could not be any 
claim of fiduciary relationship. 
In its appeal against the Delhi High Court order, before its Division 
Bench, the Supreme Court contended that there was no law 
providing for declaration of assets to the Chief Justice of India. 
Information could be sought only if it was held by or was under the 
control of any public authority under the provision of any statute 
or any law. It claimed that there was a plethora of information 
which was available with the judiciary but could not be made 
public. 
The court observed that “well-defined and publicly-known 
standards and procedures complement, rather than diminish, the 
notion of judicial independence.”45
                                                          
45 Secretary General, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, A.I.R. 
2010 Del. 159. 
 Affirming the earlier 
observations it held that the phrases ‘held by’ or ‘under the control 
of’ under Sec. 2(j) of the RTI Act, 2005 also includes information 
received or used or consciously retained, by any public authority in 
its official capacity. The declarations to the Chief Justice of India are 
made in discharge of the constitutional obligation to maintain 
higher standards and probity of judicial life and thus, are in larger 
public interest. The mechanism for declaration of assets should be 
fair, objective and transparent with a clear set of guidelines. It is 
opined that disclosure will have little or no impact without open 
public access or oversight. 
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It is pertinent to note that the court accorded right to information a 
status of a constitutional right by not exempting the office of the 
Chief Justice of India from the transparency framework. Right to 
information facilitates a vibrant democracy by assisting citizens to 
gather information required to participate in the democratic 
process and thus, to have the governors accountable to the 
governed. The decision comes as a ray of hope in the fight against 
corruption which has now become a living reality. 
The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill 2010 
The deepening crisis and public debate catalyzed the need for 
judicial accountability through The Judicial Standards and 
Accountability Bill, 2010, emphasizing the need of preserving the 
sacrosanct judiciary in the epoch of weakening credibility. This Bill 
is the legislature‘s third attempt in making the judiciary 
transparent. It lays down judicial standards of conduct and 
provides for the accountability of judges by establishing 
mechanisms for investigating even individual complaints. The Bill 
seeks to establish the National Oversight Committee,46 Judicial 
Scrutiny Panel47
                                                          
46 Chaired by a retired Chief Justice of India and comprising of a judge of 
the S.C. nominated by the Chief Justice of India, Chief Justice of the High 
Court, Attorney General and an eminent person appointed by the 
President. 
47 Comprising of a former Chief Justice and two sitting judges of the 
concerned court. 
 and an Investigation Committee. Also, it makes 
annual declaration of assets of the judges mandatory. To protect the 
judge from defamation, the Bill exempts documents and records of 
the proceedings pertaining to the complaint from the purview of 
the RTI Act, 2005 while making the report public. It prohibits the 
participants from revealing any information regarding the 
investigation. Having stringent penal provisions in place to check 
any breach of confidentiality of complaints, it prescribes 
punishment for frivolous complaints with a maximum of 5 years 
imprisonment and Rs. 5,00,000 as fine. This mechanism seems 
rather undesirable as the complaint remains confidential. 
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The National Oversight Committee has the power to issue 
advisories or warnings to judges and can also recommend the 
judge’s removal to the President. The imposition of minor 
measures by an oversight bodies constituted entirely from amongst 
the judiciary had been declared valid.48
Also, the provision of appeal to the Supreme Court, a creation of a 
Supreme Court judgment
 But it is better to have a 
broad based screening committee conducting the preliminary 
investigations which can give adequate representation to members 
from the executive, legislature, judiciary as well as the Bar. This 
being a broader based committee would be impartial, transparent 
as well as credible. 
49
Time to Off-load 
 allowing a judge to seek ‘judicial 
review’ against a Presidential order for his removal has not been 
negated by the Judicial Standard Accountability Bill, 2010. It put 
forth that this is against the constitutional provision of the 
Presidential Order not being open to challenge. 
Despite the judgment by the Delhi High Court that created ripples 
in the judicial circles, the introduction of the Bill seems to be a half-
baked effort as the legislation falters on various counts. The process 
of impeachment remains the same, which is painfully long and 
almost next to impossible to execute. It seems to be motivated only 
to restore public confidence through a confidence trick and clearly 
lacks the will to bring about a change. 
While this rather radical step on the part of legislature is indeed a 
welcome change in this era of growing concern towards good 
governance, the Bill might not lead to a balanced law, running the 
risk of reducing it to a mere paper tiger. Concerns about the same 
seem to have already surfaced as the road to reform the judiciary 
seems to be a bumpy ride, requiring apt redressal. 
The appointments to the Judiciary have not been able to keep pace 
with the vacancies, due to haggling at every step over political, 
                                                          
48 C. Ravishandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharya, 1995 (5) S.C.C. 457. 
49 Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 2219. 
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caste or communal considerations.50
                                                          
50 Moily: Adopt Campaign Mode for Speedy Justice, THE HINDU, May 12, 2011, 
 The Collegium of judges 
which is consulted in the matter of appointment of judges suffers 
from a distressing handicap in its process of selection of judges and 
is pilloried for making wrong choices or even overlooking the 
competent contenders. The list of meritorious judges who failed to 
make it to the apex court is perhaps rather long.  
The apex court, in the absence of a Secretariat is overburdened with 
administrative work. The Collegium lacks the necessary resources 
to investigate into the competence, character, and integrity of 
candidates. This makes the Collegium to resort to informal 
consultations with other judges or members of the Bar. This is a 
poor substitute for intensive data collection about the nominees’ 
qualifications, standing, merit, integrity, and potential. Thus, the 
Collegium inevitably picks up from the senior-most judges, 
overlooking several talented junior judges. 
The Collegium’s deliberations being secret and the opaqueness of 
the system further insinuate the flack it receives for its 
misadventures. Sitting judges do find it awkward and 
embarrassing to hold their brother judges, guilty of 
misdemeanours. 
In certain countries like the UK, South Africa and Canada, National 
Judicial Appointment Commissions have been instituted to appoint 
judges. They have an advantage as they being independent and 
broad-based, represent the views of the judiciary and also those of 
the executive and other sections of society. The size of the Indian 
judiciary makes it pertinent to have two separate judicial 
commissions, for the Supreme Court and the High Courts 
respectively. 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/ 
article2011015.ece?css=print (there are currently 288 vacancies in High Courts 
across India). 
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An Evaluation of the Mechanisms Available to Check 
Corruption in Judiciary 
Mahatma Gandhi had aptly remarked: “Law is nothing but the 
convenience of the powerful.”51
A mechanism for accountability being fundamental to a democratic 
framework is irreplaceable in ensuring that Part III, IV and IVA of 
the Constitution do not remain a mere illusion. The ordinary 
process of removal of a Judge by way of impeachment, being rather 
cumbersome, has resulted in total immunity to corrupt judges 
against their prosecution, leading to an increase in corruption by 
leaps and bounds. To have the already overburdened sitting judges 
to investigate is an inefficient use of resources. It also tends to 
promote the view that the judiciary is accountable to no one but 
itself.
 
52
An alternative can be an Ombudsman, who could inquire into 
complaints against the judges, followed by a consultation with the 
Chief Justice and take the requisite steps.
 A neutral and objective accountability is required as 
opposed to the adoption of an in-house procedure to provide a 
mere lip service.  
53 Ombudsman can also 
review and monitor declarations of assets made by public officials. 
United Kingdom,54 Sweden55 and Israel56
                                                          
51Sasheej Hegde, Lawyers and the Legal System in India: A Critique, READINGS 
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 354 (Sheo Kumar Lal & Kirti 
Khanna ed., 1988). 
52 Bhushan, supra note 40. 
53 Crisis: we need ombudsman over SC collegium: Nariman, EXPRESS INDIA, 
Sept. 19, 2009, http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Crisis-
we%E2%80%93need-ombudsman-over-SCcollegium/Nariman/519019/. 
54 Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman, (Feb. 17, 2012) 
http://www.judicialombudsman.gov.uk/. 
 are a few countries 
55 The Parliamentary Ombudsmen, http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx? 
Language=en (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
56 Ombudsman of the Israeli Judiciary, Ministry of Justice, http:// 
www.justice.gov.il/ MOJEng/Ombudsman/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
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having the ombudsman system in place. An identical officer 
present in South Africa is the Public Protector.57
Recommendations 
  
Independence of the judiciary means independence from the 
Executive and the Legislature, but not independence from 
accountability. Accountability is an integral part of democratic 
polity.58
                                                          
57 Public Prosecutor of South Africa, http://www.publicprotector.org/ (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
58 Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain and Anr., A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 
2299. 
 The higher judiciary sets the standard for judicial conduct 
and competency and thus, only those with absolutely 
unimpeachable integrity and quality should be appointed to these 
courts, so that they perform their duty with utmost dedication and 
skill.  
Voluntary public disclosure of assets by judges does not seem to be 
the solution. A constitutional code of conduct and behaviour is 
needed for the judges. When a finger is pointed at them, a 
commission of critical incisiveness must be prompt to investigate 
into charges and if found guilty, they should be removed without 
impeachment. Impeachment for judicial misconduct seems to be an 
extravagant affair involving too much of the administrative 
machinery. 
Where there is a high demand for corrupt services it is highly 
unrealistic to expect incentives such as higher salary alone to offset 
delinquency. A credible threat of sanctions through institutional 
control mechanisms is much needed in such a scenario. Prior to 
becoming judges, they usually amass huge assets while practicing 
as lawyers and thus, the dignity and power attached to the post of 
the judge is its only incentive. Therefore, heavy monetary sanctions 
would rarely serve the purpose which a public humiliation in the 
form of inquiry or impeachment could do. 
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With the appeal in the Second Judges Assets Case now lying with the 
Apex Court to be decided by a constitutional bench,59
Also, it is pertinent to note that the Constitution should be 
amended to alter the convention of seniority for elevation as Chief 
Justice of India. The process to ensure accountability seeks to 
enhance the integrity and capacity of the judiciary as a whole. An 
independent full time National Judicial Commission is inevitable 
for a transparent method for selecting and appointing judges as 
well as for investigating complaints against them. It is 
recommended that this Commission should adopt a procedure of 
submitting a list of candidates from which the judiciary can make 
its choice. The nominations should be based on the fairness and 
impartiality of the judge, while taking into account his intelligence 
and diligence.
 the greater 
question looming at large is can the court adjudicate upon a matter 
in which it is an interested party? In the light of the allegations 
advanced against several members of the Bench, it seems 
imperative to us that clear guidelines concerning the constitution of 
the Bench to hear the matter should be framed. 
60
                                                          
59 2010 (12) SCALE 496. 
60 Law Commission of India, Reforms in the Judiciary – Some Suggestions, 
230th Law Commission Report, Aug. 2009, http:// 
lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report230.pdf. 
 Personal characteristics and potential impediments 
should be discussed with a scrutiny of his past record. 
Similar procedure should be adopted to investigate all allegations 
against judges and take action. The committee in this case should 
be given the power to summon witnesses, require production of 
documents and take evidence. This would ensure accountability 
keeping the independence of the judiciary intact and 
uncompromised. The proper functioning of this Commission will 
go a long way in restoring the lustre of the judiciary and transform 
the Supreme Court of India into Supreme Court for Indians.  
 
